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INTRODUCTION

T
I

welve years after 9/11, the time is ripe to analyze the impact and
consequences of these attacks on the Bush and Obama administrations—
their perceptions of the nature of the threat, the identity of the enemy and
their counterterrorism policies.
America’s counterterrorism policy, like that of all other liberal
democratic States, is the result of a calculated decision-making process. The
decision-making process in the field of counterterrorism presents one of
the most complex and problematic challenges facing decision makers in the
modern era as it is a function of many components: the lack of consensus
regarding a definition of the phenomenon; the wide range of players active
in the arena of terrorism and their various characteristics, methods of
operation and types of attacks; the great public and media interest that
makes it a constant test for the leadership; the operational and ethical
constraints that limit the options available to decision makers in the field;
the severe implications that the wrong decisions are liable to have; the level
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of terrorism’s threat and its psychological implications on the public’s
morale and sense of security; terrorism’s influence on internal and
international political processes; and the dynamic evolution of the
phenomenon, which varies by region and period of time.
Decision-making processes in matters of counterterrorism, as in other
strategic matters, are influenced by the decision maker’s worldview (as a
result of one’s education, belief system and ideology), as well as input from
different security agencies, government offices, political groups, domestic
and international pressure groups, experts and advisors, and the decision
maker’s peer group. At the same time, decision-making processes are also
influenced by considerations and constraints that stem from domestic and
international systems, such as economic, security and political conditions;
international and regional events and developments; the scope and
characteristics of terrorism; and concrete intelligence information.
A decision maker in the field of counterterrorism is, therefore, in a
constant state of tension between aspiring to maximum effectiveness and
striving to maintain a country’s liberal-democratic character and values.
This tension, which I refer to as “the democratic dilemma in
counterterrorism,”1 essentially dictates the decision-making process in the
field of counterterrorism.

1. BOAZ GANOR, THE COUNTER-TERRORISM PUZZLE—A GUIDE FOR DECISION
MAKERS 147 (2005).
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Diagram A presents the decision-making process as a flow chart:

As previously stated, the entire decision-making process is influenced
by the leader’s worldview, which is formed over the course of many years
as a result of his education and life experience, and his perception of the
political and security situation prior to making a decision. Based on these
values and considerations, the first component of constructing
counterterrorism policy is understanding the nature of the threat and
defining the enemy. A distorted perception of the enemy and threat could
negatively affect the entire decision-making process by focusing efforts on
an irrelevant enemy or granting too much importance to a marginal threat.
In this context, it is important to remember that a specific country may
often face several enemies and terrorist threats with essentially different
goals and methods of operation.
As soon as a terrorist enemy is defined, decision makers must also
define the goals they seek to achieve against the enemy and vis-à-vis the
concrete threat. The decision maker could set the maximum goal of
eliminating the enemy and completely neutralizing the terrorist threat.
Alternatively, the decision maker could set the goal of damaging the
343

International Law Studies

2014

enemy’s operational capability and reducing his ability to carry out terrorist
attacks. In other instances, the decision maker could set the goal of
neutralizing the motivations and reasons for terrorism, whether by solving
the disputes underlying the conflict or by placating and appeasing the
perpetrators of terrorism. Finally, the decision maker could act in the
interest of “realpolitik” to set more limited goals for counterterrorism, such
as reducing the damage and loss of life inflicted by terrorism, preventing
certain types of terrorist attacks (for example, suicide attacks as they
generally cause a greater loss of life than other attacks) and perhaps even
accepting the phenomenon of terrorism in its current scope while trying to
prevent escalation.
Once a concrete enemy is identified and the decision maker defines the
goal of his counterterrorism operation, the next stage begins. The decision
maker will now have to choose the most appropriate tools for combating
terrorism and achieving the defined goals—in other words, a combination
of the measures and operational processes involved in counterterrorism.
These measures can be chosen from a large and diverse toolbox, including
various components in the field of counterterrorism: offensive measures,
operative measures, defensive-security measures, punitive measures,
intelligence tools and legal measures. A structured counterterrorism
strategy will naturally include a range of measures derived from each of the
above-mentioned components. The first test that a counterterrorism
measure must withstand is, of course, a test of its effectiveness, i.e.,
whether a specific measure is likely to achieve the goal defined by the
decision maker.
The effectiveness test of each measure must be examined under both
the premise of the operation’s success and the premise of its failure, i.e., it
must take into account the implications of a potential failure. Measures that
do not pass the effectiveness test are abandoned and the decision maker or
his agents must return to the toolbox in order to choose alternative
measures. Measures that do pass the effectiveness test are then examined
through the legal prism. The legal analysis is, among other things, a
function of the characteristics of the threat and the enemy, the goals
previously identified and the operational constraints. The legal test will
establish whether the measure and method of operation contemplated
comply with applicable laws and regulations, including the domestic
legislation of the country in question, relevant international law and the
values and worldview espoused by the country. Measures and methods of
operation that fail the legal test are abandoned and alternative measures are
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sought from the toolbox. Measures and methods of operation that are
found to be effective in achieving the counterterrorism goals and that
successfully pass the legal test are selected to perform counterterrorism
assignments and, together with other measures and methods of operation,
shape the counterterrorism strategy and policy of the country.
In this article, I show how the definition of the threat and the enemy at
the policy level impacted both the Bush and Obama administration’s fight
against terrorism. But before I discuss these policies in greater detail, I
would like to emphasize their common roots. They are both deeply
grounded in liberal values. At the heart of the two administration’s
counterterrorism policies lies a profound commitment to democratic values
and the belief that these should be upheld regardless of the circumstances.
The comparison between the counterterrorism policies of these two
American administrations will be based on the following three guidelines in
order to analyze both the common denominators and the differences in
approach between the Bush and Obama administrations:
 The manner in which the administrations defined their enemy;
 The goals and objectives that the administrations set for themselves
in the war on terrorism; and
 The measures and methods of operation perceived by the decision
makers to be legitimate and effective means for achieving these objectives.
The examination will be carried out by comparing the official
documents defining the administrations’ counterterrorism strategies, as well
as speeches given by Presidents Bush and Obama and their
counterterrorism advisors which revealed the principles behind their
counterterrorism policies to the public.
PART I: DEFINING THE THREAT
The foundation of any counterterrorism strategy is defining the enemy:
Who is the enemy (or enemies) that the country is facing? What are their
goals and methods of operation? Where are they deployed and where do
they operate? What are their strengths and weaknesses?
Answering the question of who is the enemy is by no means a
theoretical or philosophical matter. Any variation in the answer, or even a
slight nuance in the definition of the enemy, eventually dictates different
policies, strategies and practices for coping with terrorism. In the
introduction written by President Obama to the U.S. National Strategy for
Counterterrorism, he emphasized this point: “To defeat al-Qa’ida, we must
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define with precision and clarity who we are fighting, setting concrete and
realistic goals tailored to the specific challenges we face in different regions
of the world.”2 Defining the enemy thus constitutes an essential
preliminary step in formulating a focused strategy that allows for an
effective response to the challenges and threats of terrorism. It also has
major implications for the legal analysis and, subsequently, for the methods
that can be used to fight terrorism.3
The first attempt at identifying the enemy occurred, unsurprisingly, in
the immediate wake of 9/11. In the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force, which has since then formed the legal basis for the use of force
against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the enemy was identified in very broad
terms:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary means and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.4

Far from shunning the question of the enemy’s identity, President Bush
brought it into focus again in an address to Congress and the nation just a
few days later: “Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The
evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated
terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.”5
President Bush further clarified that Al-Qaeda was not merely a
sporadic compound of terrorist cells, and pointed to the fact that these
terrorist groups share the same ideology and radical, religious, Islamist
worldview. However, he immediately took pains to emphasize that these
2. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf
[hereinafter OBAMA NATIONAL STRATEGY].
3. For a discussion on the definition of terrorism, see, e.g., GANOR, supra note 1, at 1;
BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 1 (2006); ALEX SCHMID & ALBERT JONGMAN,
POLITICAL TERRORISM (2005).
4. Authorization for Use of Military Force Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)).
5. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001) (transcript available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html) [hereinafter Joint
Session Address].
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radical Islamist elements do not represent the spirit of Islam and even
contradict the religion’s values:
The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been
rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics—a
fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The
terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all
Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians,
including women and children.6

President Bush defined the enemy as more than Al-Qaeda’s core
group, and included the circles that surround the organization as well. The
first circle included other organizations that support a similar ideological
religious view and either work together with Al-Qaeda or are inspired by it,
such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan: “There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60
countries. . . . Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been
found, stopped and defeated.”7
Importantly, Bush’s description of the enemy did not end with AlQaeda and its affiliates. He identified a second circle of enemies, defined as
countries and governments that provide protection, aid and shelter to AlQaeda and its supporters. Specifically, Bush addressed the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan demanding, among other things, that the Taliban stop
protecting Al-Qaeda, disarm the organization, arrest its people and hand
over its leaders to the United States:
By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder.
. . . The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our
many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and
every government that supports them. . . . As long as the United States of
America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this
will be an age of liberty, here and across the world.8

From this description, three important characteristics stand out: the global
nature of the threat, the centrality of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and the
existence of a second circle of enemies.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Two years after 9/11, in its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the
Bush administration elaborated on its definition of the enemy:
The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly
it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents. Those who employ terrorism,
regardless of their specific secular or religious objectives, strive to subvert
the rule of law and effect change through violence and fear. These
terrorists also share the misguided belief that killing, kidnapping,
extorting, robbing, and wreaking havoc to terrorize people are legitimate
forms of political action.9

This statement by the Bush administration has moral and utilitarian
undertones. From a utilitarian standpoint, the administration identified a
common feature among the enemies threatening U.S. security: they use
terrorism, understood as the intentional use of political violence against
non-combatants. According to the Bush administration, any entity that
resorts to such illegitimate tactics is an enemy. President Bush did not map
out the dissenting and supporting organizations and factions in order to
analyze their ideologies and examine their motivations and justifications.
Rather, he set a clear line and anyone who crossed it would be considered
an enemy of the United States. In addition to its utilitarian purpose, this
line also demonstrated strong moral undertones as it neutralized the wellknown argument that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter.” In upholding the same moral values that underlie humanitarian
law, President Bush declared the intentional use of violence against noncombatants as the standard for differentiating between friend and foe.
Six years later, in a radical and much-noticed shift, President Obama set
out his vision in the “Cairo speech.” The overarching policy was clear: “To
seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the
world.”10 President Obama explained that “Islam is not part of the problem
in combating violent extremism—it is an important part of promoting
9. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 1 (2003),
available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_
Terrorism_Strategy.pdf [hereinafter BUSH NATIONAL STRATEGY].
10. President Barack Obama, Address at Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt: A New
Beginning (June 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press
_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09)
[hereinafter
Cairo
University Address].
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peace” and added that the enemy is “violent extremists who pose a grave
threat to our security.”11
Ostensibly, according to Obama’s definition, the enemy has no Islamist
identity and despite his attempt to avoid the alienation of the Muslim world
from the United States, Obama established a connection between the
“extremists” and Muslim communities around the world when he stated in
that same speech, “The sooner the extremists are isolated and unwelcome
in Muslim communities, the sooner we will all be safer.”12
The Obama administration takes a critical view of the Bush
administration’s characterization of terrorism as the enemy. In his speech
in August 2009, President Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, John Brennan, explained that
the President did not describe the struggle as “a war on terrorism.”13 The
explanation given by Brennan was that terrorism is a tactic and, of course,
one cannot defeat a tactic. According to Brennan, even the terms
“jihadists” and “Islamists” cannot be used to define the enemy as using this
term gives the terrorists the legitimization they seek but do not deserve, as
“jihad” literally means “to purify oneself or to wage a holy struggle for a
moral goal.”14
Who then is the enemy according to President Obama's
counterterrorism advisor? The Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its
partners. The Obama administration not only rejects the idea that terrorism
might be the enemy, it also disapproves of the definition of the threat as a
global one. Such a definition, the administration argues, would only
reinforce the image that Al-Qaeda is trying to achieve, as a very organized
global entity ready to replace the government of sovereign countries with a
global caliphate.15
Instead, the Obama administration’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism
seeks to defeat Al-Qaeda and its affiliates:

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Remarks by John O. Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: A
New Approach to Safeguarding Americans (Aug. 6, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-John-Brennan-at-the-Centerfor-Strategic-and-International-Studies/).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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A decade after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States
remains at war with al-Qa’ida. . . . The United States deliberately uses the
word “war” to describe our relentless campaign against al-Qa’ida.
However, this Administration has made it clear that we are not at war
with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. We are at war with a
specific organization—al-Qa’ida. . . . Although Al-Qaeda is our strategic
as well as tactical CT [counterterrorism] priority, other designated
terrorist organizations pose a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests. .
. . Iran and Syria remain active sponsors of terrorism, and we remain
committed to opposing the support these state sponsors provide to
groups pursuing terrorist attacks to undermine regional stability.16

Notably, the administration expands the definition of the enemy to include
homegrown terrorism: “Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents represent
the preeminent terrorist threat to our country. We know that these groups
are actively seeking to recruit or inspire Americans to carry out attacks
against the United States, particularly as they are facing greater pressure in
their safe-havens abroad.”17
The change in the definition of the enemy under Obama had a clear
impact on the administration’s understanding and evaluation of the threat.
Immediately after the terrorist attack against U.S. soldiers at Fort Hood in
2010, President Obama said: “We cannot fully know what leads a man to
do such a thing.”18 Shortly thereafter he added, “given the potential
warning signs that may have been known prior these shootings, we must
uncover what steps—if any—could have been taken to avert this
tragedy.”19
16. OBAMA NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 2, 3, 18.
17. THE WHITE HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT
EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Aug. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf
[hereinafter EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS].
18.
President Barack Obama, Weekly Address: President Obama Extends
Condolences to the Fort Hood Community (Nov. 7, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-extendscondolences-fort-hood-community).
19. President Barack Obama, Weekly Address: President Obama Calls for
Comprehensive Review of Events Leading to Tragedy at Fort Hood, Barack Obama on
Investigating the Fort Hood Massacre (Nov. 14, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-callscomprehensive-review-events-leading-tragedy-fo).
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But what warning signs can there be when Islamists and jihadists are
not defined as part of the threat? According to the Obama administration’s
definition of the threat, a situation in which a Muslim American soldier
becomes a jihadist and spends time at religious centers known to serve as
meeting places for Islamists and jihadists did not constitute a warning sign.
When jihadists and Islamists are not defined as the enemy, weeds such as
the Tsarnaev brothers, who perpetrated the Boston Marathon attack in
April 2013, do not appear on the radar of the security services. Such
terrorists are not members of Al-Qaeda nor are they part of the operational
network surrounding the epicenter of Al-Qaeda. They are inspired by the
Salafi–Jihadist ideology that motivated them to carry out terrorist attacks,
yet these ideologies are not being defined as triggers of terrorism. This is
either the result of a misconception in reference to the definition of the
enemy or an outcome of political correctness. Either way, the
consequences can be very damaging.
The Bush and Obama administrations took opposing approaches on
defining the enemy. While the Bush administration took the overly
comprehensive approach by declaring war on terrorism around the world,
the Obama administration took the overly narrow approach by declaring
war on Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Whether the definition of the threat is
too broad or too narrow, it has significant implications on the methods
used to contain it. When the definition of the threat is too broad, it
becomes less effective by making it more difficult to find the appropriate
methods to deal with the problem. The definition of the threat by
President Bush created a situation whereby, in the name of the war on
terrorism, the United States entered into an exhausting and unnecessary
war in Iraq.
When the definition of the threat is too narrow, it may overlook
important aspects and components of the threat. By focusing on Al-Qaeda,
while ignoring the Islamist-jihadist global characteristics of the terrorism
threat, Obama’s definition of the threat undermines the U.S. ability to
detect in advance the perpetrators, initiators and supporters of terrorism,
and to thwart terrorist attacks.
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PART II: SETTING THE GOALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM
The efficacy of a counterterrorism policy is measured against the goals and
objectives on which it was founded. Sometimes the goals are limited and
unsatisfactory, and even when obtained they do not provide an appropriate
response to the threat of terrorism. At other times the goals are irrelevant,
in the sense of “looking for the quarter under the light,” and their
achievement may, at most, contribute to the good feeling and public
relations of the decision makers. In yet other cases, the counterterrorism
goals are extremely comprehensive and far-reaching; achieving them is, in
fact, impossible, and sometimes not even required for effectively coping
with this threat. In this regard, it should be noted that decision makers may
take a comprehensive approach even if the goals are unattainable in order
to set a high point of reference for which all entities dealing in
counterterrorism are to strive. Finally, decision makers set a relatively low
bar of attainable counterterrorism goals and objectives in order to prove to
their constituencies that their counterterrorism policy is effective.
Immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush
adopted a comprehensive approach in determining American
counterterrorism objectives. The United States, he explained, did not
intend to make any distinction between the terrorists who carried out the
9/11 attacks and those who support them.20 Bush’s approach was
characterized as proactive, and involved eliminating terrorism and
destroying it anywhere it was found to be growing.21
The Bush administration’s counterterrorism strategy was further
elaborated a year and a half after the attacks. Though the strategy
continued to advocate a comprehensive counterterrorism approach, a shift
in the definition of the goals was noticeable.
The goal—which had been the defeat of terrorism around the world—
became the defeat of terrorist organizations with global aspirations.
Ultimately, the U.S. counterterrorism policy's strategic goal was not only to
protect Americans, but also to free the world of fear and apprehension
from terrorism:

20. President George W. Bush, 9/11 Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001)
(transcript available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911addressto
thenation.htm).
21. Joint Session Address, supra note 5.
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Our goal will be reached when Americans and other civilized people
around the world can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks. . .
Ultimately, our fight against terrorism will help foster an international
environment where our democratic interests are secure and the values of
liberty are respected around the world.22

Much like its definition of the enemy, the Bush administration’s
definition of objectives was a statement of values and morals. However,
beyond the value/moral aspect, which it can be argued represents a utopian
and even simplistic worldview, the question remains as to whether this
comprehensive policy is justified in utilitarian terms. Are the goals set by
the Bush administration attainable? Is there a global connection between
the terrorist entities threatening the United States and its interests around
the world that necessitates the defeat of the global jihad phenomenon
worldwide? Can the United States be protected from terrorist organizations
without dealing with the wider context of the terrorism phenomenon? The
answer given by President Bush in January 2002 to these questions was
unequivocal: “America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are
protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased
vigilance at home.”23
In light of the above, the Bush administration’s counterterrorism
strategy (“The 4D Strategy”) had four objectives from which, at times, its
operative goals were derived:
 Defeating terrorist organizations with a global agenda and global
aspirations by attacking their leadership, their command and control
systems, their bases, their communications systems and their financing. To
that end, it was determined that the United States would work at
identifying the terrorist organization and its operatives, ascertain their
staging location, and destroy them.
 Denying the continued support of terrorist organizations and
insisting that countries take upon themselves the responsibility to act
against entities in their territory that are threatening the world, by
demonstrating zero tolerance for the phenomenon of countries supporting
terrorism, creating unified standards for combating terrorism and creating a

22. BUSH NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 1, 3.
23. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (Jan. 29, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/?pid=29644).
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unified international front by building a strong coalition of countries
fighting terrorism.
 Defending the United States and its citizens and interests, both at
home and around the world, while identifying and neutralizing threats as
early as possible, inter alia, by increasing the American public's awareness of
the dangers of terrorism, streamlining the integrative activity of the security
systems in the United States in times of crisis, and establishing the
Department of Homeland Security with the aim of mobilizing, organizing
and improving U.S. security preparedness.
 Diminishing the conditions exploited by terrorist organizations by
creating international partnerships for reinforcing weak States and
preventing the development of terrorism in these countries as well as
achieving victory in “the war of ideas”; preventing the conditions and
ideologies that create fertile ground for the support of terrorism, instilling
the principle that all terrorist activities are illegitimate and reinforcing the
drive for liberty among communities ruled by supporters of global
terrorism.24
For his part, President Obama chose to take the narrow approach in
defining the goals and objectives of his counterterrorism policy,
emphasizing the need to set realistic goals in face of a specific enemy (AlQaeda):
This Strategy builds on groundwork laid by previous strategies . . . . At
the same time, it outlines an approach that is more focused and specific
than were previous strategies. . . . This Strategy stands to testify to our
friends, our partners, and to our terrorist enemies: Here is our plan of
action to achieve the defeat of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents.
It is this outcome we seek, and indeed it is the only one we will accept.25

This official document details the main goals of the Obama’s
administration in this field: defending the American people, the homeland
and American interests; defeating Al-Qaeda, its agents and supporters, and
attacking their network; preventing the terrorists’ development and ability
to obtain weapons of mass destruction; eliminating their sanctuaries;
establishing and reinforcing international alliances in the field of
counterterrorism; coping with Al-Qaeda’s ideology and the support that
the organization receives; neutralizing the motivations for violence that Al24. BUSH NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 15–28.
25. OBAMA NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 2, 19.
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Qaeda exploits for its own needs; and depriving terrorists of the means that
motivate them.26
The goals at the basis of the American strategy under Obama are all
tied, in one way or another, to a direct confrontation with Al-Qaeda.
According to the document, the United States is facing a developing threat
and every effort must be made to neutralize the resonance of Al-Qaeda’s
messages. This is achieved by addressing the root causes motivating the
violence and slowing down Al-Qaeda’s recruitment of new generations of
terrorists.27
Obama interprets this as requiring the development of de-radicalization
processes among the relevant communities in the United States. This
strategy was detailed in a separate document, published in August 2008,
entitled “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the
United States.”28 The document emphasizes the need to prevent violent
extremists and their supporters from influencing, radicalizing, financing or
recruiting individuals or groups within the United States for the purpose of
carrying out violent acts. The administration calls on local communities,
the private sector and the entire American public to cooperate in
developing effective programs and initiatives. The document refrains from
defining the danger in a manner connecting it to Islam or to Islamist
elements. It stresses that history teaches that threats change from time to
time, erupting in the name of different ideologies and alleged injustices:
though the threat currently originates from one sector of the American
population, it may originate from a different sector in the future. As for the
role of federal authorities in de-radicalization, the administration
contemplates increased federal involvement in providing support to
communities that may be a target for subversion by violent extremists.
Such support, however, is beyond the scope of national security and
focuses instead on civilian issues, such as employment, health and human
rights.29 Obama’s strategy on de-radicalization might be regarded as an
indirect preventive policy - but, importantly, it does not identify an internal
enemy in the United States.
Comparing the two administrations’ goals and objectives reinforces the
basic difference between their approaches—a comprehensive approach
26. Id. at 8–10.
27. Id. at 19.
28. EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 5.
29. EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 17, at 5.
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taken by the Bush administration versus a narrow approach taken by the
Obama administration. Adopting the comprehensive approach after a
severe terrorist attack or a series of attacks, such as the 9/11 attacks, is a
natural, almost deterministic process, especially for a democratic
government attentive to the people’s wishes and desires. It points to the
government’s action in the field of counterterrorism and to its efforts in
bringing back the personal security of its citizens, almost at any price. In
contrast to President Bush’s comprehensive objective of defeating
terrorism around the world, requiring a prolonged attrition campaign,
President Obama—who came into power eight years after 9/11—set the
narrower objective of defeating the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization. This
objective, Obama believes, can be attained in a focused campaign hunting
the organization’s leaders and main operatives. At the same time, as noted
above, Obama developed a de-radicalization strategy to build on the
cooperation of Muslim communities within the United States.
PART III: THE MEANS AND METHODS FOR COPING WITH TERRORISM—
THE TOOL BOX
The two administrations greatly differed in the way in which they intend to
achieve the goals that they set for themselves. In accordance with his
broad definition of the threat and his comprehensive approach, President
Bush clarified his intention to harness all of the American administration’s
abilities, allocate the necessary resources and grant security forces the
required prerogatives to effectively cope with terrorism: “We will direct
every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence,
and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of
the global terror network.”30
President Bush further stated that the United States would attack the
entities financing terrorism, turn the terrorists against one another, force
them to run from place to place, and hunt the countries giving shelter and
asylum to terrorists. Most emblematic of his broad strategy, President Bush
also gave a clear message to the world’s nations: every government must
define whether it stands alongside the United States in the campaign
against terrorism or if it stands alongside the terrorists; neutrality cannot be

30. Joint Session Address, supra note 5.
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maintained.31 Bush’s goal was to establish a wide international coalition
equipped with every means possible to cope with terrorist organizations
and their supporters—military, political, diplomatic, intelligence, financial,
legal, technological and other.32
In contrast to the Bush administration’s efforts to counter the
operational capability of the terrorists, the Obama administration put the
emphasis on countering terrorists’ motivation. Instead of condemning the
Islamic extremist perceptions that motivate terrorists all over the world,
Obama’s administration preferred a conciliatory approach. This approach
was demonstrated in the remarks made by John Brennan in May 2010:
“Nor do we describe our enemy as ‘jihadists’ or ‘Islamists’ because jihad is
a holy struggle, a legitimate tenant of Islam, meaning to purify oneself or
one’s community . . . .”33
The Obama administration initiated this process of reconciliation
immediately after President Obama’s first election victory in his 2009 Cairo
speech:
I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and
Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual
respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not
exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and
share common principles—principles of justice and progress; tolerance
and the dignity of all human beings.34

At the base of its counterterrorism strategy, the Obama administration
placed the need to adhere to core American values—human rights, the
right for privacy, civil liberties, governance and transparency, and
maintaining the rule of law. According to Obama, each of these is meant to
reinforce security, but practically they are limiting the prerogatives of the
American security and law enforcement agencies. An example of the
tension between the above-mentioned liberal values and the effectiveness
31. President George W. Bush, Rose Garden Speech (June 24, 2002) (transcript
available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbushtwostatesolution.htm).
32. BUSH NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 9, at 29–30.
33. John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Center for Strategic Study and International Studies:
Securing the Homeland by Renewing American Strength, Resilience and Values (May 26,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarksassistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi).
34. Cairo University Address, supra note 10.
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of the counterterrorism strategy can be seen in the difficulties faced by the
Los Angeles Police Department in implementing its policy of mapping the
Muslim community.35 Although the principle of mapping was meant to
help identify the weeds and set them apart from the overall community,
this policy was criticized as endangering the community’s right to privacy
and its civil liberties.36
Alongside its indirect activities aimed at neutralizing the sympathetic
environment in which Al-Qaeda and its branches operate, the Obama
administration continued its direct attacks on the organization’s terrorist
abilities, which contributed to its success in eliminating Osama bin Laden
in Pakistan in May 2011.
CONCLUSION
Though the counterterrorism strategies of both American administrations
stem from similar worldviews and values, they significantly differ in their
understanding of the threat. The Bush administration adopted a proactive
strategy designed to promote democracy in problematic countries and
regions as part of the campaign against terrorism. In contrast, the Obama
administration translated its democratic liberal worldview into a policy that
limits the prerogatives and work methods of American security and
intelligence agencies.
An analysis of the administrations’ policies reveals that the main
difference lies in their definition of the enemy and the nature of the threat.
While the Bush administration declared war on terrorism around the world,
the Obama administration took a narrow and focused approach clearly
directed at Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
When the definition of the threat is too broad, it may undermine the
efficacy of the counterterrorism strategy and make it more difficult to
identify appropriate measures required to cope with the phenomenon.
President Bush’s definition of the threat created a situation whereby, in the
name of a “war on terrorism,” the United States became embroiled on
various fronts for much longer than it had originally planned. When the
35. Azi Paybarah, When Bratton quit Muslim mapping, CAPITAL (Dec. 12, 2013, 5:00
AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2013/12/8537222/when-brattonquit-muslim-mapping.
36. Richard Winton et al., LAPD defends Muslim mapping effort, LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2007), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-lapd10nov10,0,2077315.story?
page=2#axzz2xODVTDJo.
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definition of the threat is too narrow, it may not include important aspects
and elements of the threat. And indeed, the definition of the threat
according to the Obama administration overlooks the roots of jihadist
terrorism, blurs the distinction between moderate entities and radical
jihadist entities in the Muslim world, and harms the motivation of
moderate Muslims to face and hold a true internal battle with violent
Islamists.
The question to be asked then is which one of the two administrations
was correct in its attitude towards Islamists and jihadists? As noted by
Bernard Lewis, while Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda followers
probably do not represent Islam, and many of their activities and
statements contradict the main principals of Islam, they certainly emerged
from the Islamic culture as much as Hitler and the Nazi party emerged
from the Christian world.37 Therefore, Lewis argues that the phenomenon
of global jihad needs to be examined in its cultural, religious and historical
context.38 In this way, the eradication or weakening of global terrorism
may be achieved over time. On the other hand, ignoring Islamist-jihadist
ideology, goals and activities, which call for the death of anyone who does
not accept their radical and dangerous interpretation of Islam, will not lead
to true reconciliation between the United States or the West and Islam;
rather, it will only weaken the moderate Muslims who require great courage
when facing these fundamentalists. The Obama administration would do
well to listen attentively to the pleadings of the founder of the Muslim
Congress in Canada, Tariq Fatah, when he said: “Please understand there is
a difference between Islam as a faith and Islamism which is a political
ideology stating that the Western culture has to be destroyed.”39 Without
addressing the ideological root causes of terrorism, the surgical targeted
37. BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM: HOLY WAR AND UNHOLY TERROR 134
(2004).
38. Id.
39. David Wood, Tarek Fatah Talk at Ideacity 2011, ANSWERING MUSLIMS: THE
ISLAMOBLOG OF ACTS 17 APOLOGETICS (Aug. 12, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://www.answering
muslims.com/2011/08/tarek-fatah-talk-at-ideacity-2011.html; quoted in Boaz Ganor, The
U.S. Counter Terrorism Policy – The Calm before the Storm INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
COUNTER-TERRORISM (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Com
mentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/982/currentpage/1/Default.aspx. This argument was also
discussed at length in Daniel Pipes, Islam and Islamism: Faith and Ideology, THE NATIONAL
INTEREST, Spring 2000, at 87, available at http://www.danielpipes.org/366/islam-andislamism-faith-and-ideology.
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killings of Al-Qaeda leaders will not result in the disappearance of the
phenomenon. The elimination of bin Laden and his cohorts may provide
the United States temporary peace, but it will be the calm before the storm.
This article demonstrates the intimate link between policy and law
when it comes to counterterrorism. Identifying the enemy plays a crucial
role in providing the government with the authority needed to fight
terrorism—from the authority to investigate threats to the authority to
detain and use lethal force. The two administrations significantly differ in
their understanding of the enemy, both at the organizational and individual
levels. They also differ in their understanding of the boundaries of the
battlefield. Ultimately, contrasting the policies adopted by the Bush and
Obama administrations reveals that the early identification of the enemy by
decision makers shaped the nature and scope of each administration’s
counterterrorism strategies.
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